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Notice of Forfeiture to Incarcerated Individuals: 
Did the Supreme Court Get it Right in  
Dusenbery v. United States? 
Michelle Murphy-Riveria* 
I. INTRODUCTION: NOTICE OF FORFEITURE FROM THE GOVERNMENT 
TO INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS  
The U.S. Constitution requires that the government provide an 
individual with due process before depriving him of “life, liberty, or 
property.”1 A question arose as to what exactly this due process 
entails in the context of providing notice of forfeiture to incarcerated 
individuals. Was mailing such notice to the facility in which the 
individual is detained enough, or must the individual actually receive 
the notice? Or was the answer somewhere in between these two 
options?  
Recently, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this issue with 
their decision in Dusenbery v. United States.2 In a 5-4 decision, the 
Court ruled that sending notice by certified mail to the individual’s 
place of incarceration satisfies due process.3  
Although the Supreme Court had never before dealt directly with 
this topic, it had decided several cases that were closely related to the 
issue. In these decisions, the Court avoided actual notice 
requirements,4 but instead expanded the due process requirements for 
notice. The Court found that: publication is not an adequate form of 
notice if the individual’s address is ascertainable;5 it is insufficient if 
the government mails notice to the incarcerated individual’s home 
 
 * J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2002.  
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 2. 534 U.S. 161 (2002).  
 3. Id. 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 24, 34. 
 5. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950). 
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address but knows that the individual cannot get to that address;6 
actual notice is desirable;7 and, there should be an emphasis on the 
balance between the individual’s substantial need for actual notice 
and the government’s interest in expediency.8   
These Supreme Court decisions and their rationales lay the 
foundation for the circuit split that developed regarding the level and 
type of notice that due process mandates for incarcerated individuals. 
The Second and Eighth Circuits cited the Supreme Court in their 
holdings that the government must provide actual notice of forfeiture 
to incarcerated individuals or their attorneys.9 However, the Ninth 
and Tenth Circuits used the same Supreme Court cases to support the 
position that actual notice is not required and that mailing notice to 
the institution in which the individual is detained is sufficient.10 The 
Third Circuit took these opposing views into consideration when it 
made its decision in United States v. One Toshiba Color Television.11 
The Toshiba court formed a third viewpoint that leaned toward actual 
notice but stopped short of imposing such a requirement on the 
government.12  
This recent development addresses whether or not the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment13 requires that the federal 
government provide actual notice of forfeiture to incarcerated 
individuals, and it proposes that the Supreme Court erred in its recent 
decision in Dusenbery. Although the Supreme Court did avoid 
 
 6. Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 38-40 (1972).  
 7. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983). See infra text 
accompanying note 35. 
 8. Tulsa Prof’l. Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 489 (1988). See infra text 
accompanying note 43. 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 46-62. The Eighth Circuit has extended this further, 
requiring actual notice of forfeiture any time the government is detaining or prosecuting an 
individual and subsequently decides to instigate forfeiture proceedings. United States v. 
Woodall, 12 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1993). See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 63-75. 
 11. 213 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 12. See id. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clause requires that an individual not 
“. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” Id. 
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making any absolute actual notice requirements in past decisions,14 
such a requirement for incarcerated individuals is the best logical 
outcome using the balancing test offered by the Court.15 The property 
owner’s interest is extremely high, there is no one similarly situated 
to protect the individual’s interests in the property, and the detainee is 
not in a position in which he can exercise any control over the 
likelihood that he will actually receive any kind of correspondence.16 
On the other side of this argument is the relatively light burden on the 
government to go the extra step of ensuring actual notice.17 This light 
burden is especially evident when considering how easy modern 
technology makes it to provide and document actual receipt of mail, 
and when recognizing that the government has complete control over 
the individual and his ability to receive correspondence. The 
individual’s interest outweighs the additional burden imposed on the 
government, and therefore the government should provide actual 
notice of forfeiture to those it chooses to incarcerate. 
Part II of this piece examines the history of past Supreme Court 
decisions concerning notice of forfeiture. It also shows how these 
decisions led to the circuit split regarding notice to incarcerated 
individuals and considers the policy arguments for each side. Part III 
looks at the majority opinion in Dusenbery and the four-justice 
dissent. Part IV analyzes these cases, comparing and contrasting the 
language of the Supreme Court in its past decisions concerning notice 
with the holdings and rationales of the recent circuit courts and the 
most recent Supreme Court. It also proposes the most logical and 
reasonable standards and requirements. Part V simply summarizes 
the discussion in a short overall conclusion. 
 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 24, 34.  
 15. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The Court 
established this balancing test by noting that the adequacy of notice provided should be 
determined according to the particular surrounding circumstances, including the property 
owner’s interest, the existence of others in similar situations who would protect the individual’s 
interests, and the burden on the party seeking to give notice. Id. at 313-19; see also infra text 
accompanying note 21. 
 16. See infra text accompanying note 55.  
 17. See infra text accompanying note 56. 
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II. HISTORY: DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS INVOLVING NOTICE 
A. Past Supreme Court Decisions 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co.18 paved the way for the issue. In Mullane, the 
Supreme Court analyzed the constitutional sufficiency of notice 
provided to beneficiaries in a common trust fund.19 The Court’s 
holding required the mailing of notice to all parties of interest whose 
names and addresses were known or easily ascertainable.20 It 
analyzed due process by stating that, “[a]n elementary and 
fundamental requirement . . . is notice reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections.”21 Thus, the party giving notice must employ means, 
“such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might 
reasonably adopt to accomplish it.”22 In this case, the use of 
publication as notice to non-residents did not meet the necessary 
standards.23 Although the Court did not advocate actual notice in 
Mullane,24 it did begin to look at notice of forfeiture from the 
 
 18. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 19. Id. at 307. 
 20. Id. at 318.  
 21. Id. at 314. The Court noted that the adequacy of the notice depends upon the particular 
surrounding circumstances, such as the level of the property owner’s interest, the likelihood that 
others in similar situations will protect that property owner’s interests, and the reasonableness 
of requiring more from the party seeking to give notice. Id. at 313-19. It rejected publication as 
reasonable notice to those beneficiaries whose addresses were available, noting that the 
publication was not “reasonably calculated” to inform them since they could easily be notified 
by other means—namely, the mail system, which was seen as an “[e]fficient and inexpensive 
means of communication.” Id. at 319. 
 22. Id. at 315. The Court noted that the law looks to the standards of the business world to 
determine what is reasonable and what one who truly wants to inform would do. It pointed out 
that a business person who found it in his own best interest to communicate information to 
people whose addresses he had on file would not be satisfied with publication. Therefore, 
publication in these situations is not reasonable in terms of the law. Id. at 319-20.  
 23. Id.  
 
 24. Id. at 314. “Personal service has not in all circumstances been regarded as 
indispensable to the process due to residents, and it has more often been held unnecessary as to 
nonresidents. We disturb none of the established rules on these subjects.” Id. However, the 
Court did find that a particular means of notice is unconstitutional if, “under the circumstances 
it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at 
hand.” Id. at 319. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol10/iss1/9
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perspective of a balance of interests.25  
In Robinson v. Hanrahan,26 the Supreme Court expanded 
Mullane27 to cover incarcerated individuals.28 The Court relied 
heavily on the precedent of Mullane29 in holding that the defendant 
was not afforded due process.30 The Court found that the State’s 
mailing of notice to an incarcerated individual’s home address when 
the State knew the confined individual could not get to that address 
could in no way constitute notice “reasonably calculated” to inform 
the defendant of the pendency of the proceedings.31  
In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,32 the Supreme Court 
again spoke for the rights of those in jeopardy of losing property to 
receive notice when it held that the interests of a mortgagee in real 
property required personal service or mailed notice to the mortgagee 
in order to fulfill due process requirements.33 Although the Court 
again did not specifically advocate actual notice,34 it did point to the 
balance of interests and focused on the right of the individual with 
interest in the property to be informed.35 The Court thus held that the 
 
 25. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 21. 
 26. 409 U.S. 38 (1972). 
 27. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 28. 409 U.S. at 38-39. The case involved a man who was arrested and incarcerated for 
armed robbery. While he was in custody awaiting trial, the state sent notice of forfeiture 
proceedings involving his automobile to his home address even though they were aware of the 
fact that he was in jail and could not get to his home. Id.  
 29. Specifically, the Court cited the requirement from Mullane that notice must be 
“reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Id. at 40 
(citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).  
 30. 409 U.S. at 38, 40. 
 31. Id. Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the 
Illinois Supreme Court because the Illinois Supreme Court granted forfeiture. Id. 
 32. 462 U.S. 791 (1983). The case dealt with an Indiana statute that required only notice 
by publication and mailing to an owner of property when property was to be sold for 
nonpayment of taxes. The issue was whether or not this provided adequate notice to the 
mortgagee. Id. at 792-93. 
 33. Id. at 798-800. 
 34. In fact, the Court did take the government’s burden into account, saying that “[w]e do 
not suggest, however, that a governmental body is required to undertake extraordinary efforts to 
discover the identity and whereabouts of a mortgagee whose identity is not in the public 
record.” Id. at 798, 799; see also supra text accompanying note 24. 
 35. 462 U.S. at 800. The Court made it clear that actual notice was desirable, saying that 
“[n]otice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional 
precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any 
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notice provided did not meet the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment36 and was therefore 
unconstitutional.37 
In Tusla Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope,38 the 
Court followed precedent set in Mullane39 and Mennonite,40 finding 
that due process requires notice by mail or other means as certain to 
ensure actual notice.41 Pope is important because it emphasized the 
balance of interest between the property owner42 and the 
government.43 The Supreme Court concluded that giving actual 
notice to those whose addresses are known or reasonably 
ascertainable does not unduly burden the government’s interest in the 
timely resolution of proceedings44 and therefore found that the 
government could not rely on publication alone.45  
B. Circuit Split Concerning Notice to Incarcerated Individuals  
1. Actual Notice 
The Second and Eighth Circuits held that the State must provide 
actual notice of forfeiture proceedings to incarcerated individuals. 
The Second Circuit dealt with the issue in Weng v. United States.46 In 
 
party.” Id.  
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (applying the Due Process Clause from the Fifth 
Amendment to the states). See supra text accompanying note 13. 
 37. 462 U.S. at 791, 800. Accordingly, the judgment of the Indiana Court of Appeals was 
reversed. 
 38. 485 U.S. 478 (1988). The case involved an Oklahoma probate law requiring claims 
against an estate to be presented to the executor/executrix within two weeks of publication of 
notice concerning the instigation of probate proceedings. The issue was whether or not this 
publication provided adequate notice to satisfy the Due Process Clause. Id. at 479.  
 39. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 40. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).  
 41. 485 U.S. 478, 489-91 (1988).  
 42. Id. This includes any individual with interest in the property. Id. 
 43. Id. at 489-90. The “substantial practical need for actual notice” is weighed against the 
state’s interest in resolving probates expeditiously. Id. at 489.  
 44. Id. at 489-90. The Court pointed out that mail service is an “inexpensive and efficient 
mechanism that is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice.” Id. (citing to Menonite, 462 
U.S. at 789, 800; Ercene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319).  
 45. Id. at 490. 
 46. 137 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1998). In this case, the claimant was arrested and convicted on 
narcotics charges. He was in federal custody serving his sentence for the entire time involved in 
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Weng, the government sent an incarcerated property owner two 
notices of forfeiture, “one for the currency and one for the jewelry.”47 
It sent the notices by certified mail to the individual’s last known 
home address and to a federal detention facility.48 First, the court held 
that in order to satisfy the criteria in Mullane49 a federal government 
agency should, at the very least, determine in which institution a 
federal detainee is incarcerated and send the notice to that particular 
institution.50  
Next, the Weng court looked at the situation in which the notice is 
received by the institution at the time the individual is detained 
there.51 It held that “[a]bsent special justifying circumstances,” notice 
of forfeiture sent to the institution in which a property owner is 
detained is not adequate unless it is “actually” received by the 
detainee.52 The court once again pointed to Mullane53 as precedent for 
looking to the specific circumstances. In its analysis, the court 
balanced the types and levels of individual interest involved, taking 
 
the case/appeal.  
 47. Id. at 711. 
 48. Id. No evidence was given by the government as to the reason they believed the 
individual was incarcerated at the particular detention center, rather they simply asserted 
conclusively that he was there. In fact, the individual submitted evidence showing that this 
assumption may have been wrong, at least in terms of the jewelry notification. The individual 
was transferred often and evidence showed he was not at that particular institute at the time the 
institute received the notice. Id. The government argued that “due process does not require that 
the claimant receive actual notice of a forfeiture proceeding, but rather, that the Government act 
reasonably in selecting and employing a means likely to inform the claimant of the proceeding.” 
Id. at 711. 
 49. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See supra text 
accompanying notes 21-25. 
 50. Weng, 137 F.3d at 709, 714. The government should reasonably be able to locate the 
individual, especially when the government knows the individual is in its custody, and when it 
is involved in prosecuting him on the same facts upon which the forfeiture is based. If a 
government agency truly wanted to inform the detainee, they would surely not settle for less. 
Therefore, if the individual was not at the institution to which the notice was sent, the notice did 
not satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Id at 713-14.  
 51. Id. at 714-15. As for the currency notice, the detainee did not challenge the fact that 
the correct institution received it while he was actually detained there. However, he did allege 
that he never actually received it—no one ever delivered it to him. Id. at 714.  
 52. Id. at 714. The court disagreed with the government’s claim that this was reasonably 
calculated to inform the detainee. The notice must be delivered not only to the detention 
facility, but actually to the prisoner. Id. 
 53. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-20 (1950). See supra 
text accompanying note 21. 
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into account the probability of anyone similarly situated acting on 
behalf of the property owner’s interest, against the reasonableness of 
requiring stricter standards for those attempting to give notice.54 In 
cases where the government detains a property owner on the same 
grounds upon which the forfeiture action is based, the court found 
that the interest of the detainee was strong enough, and the burden on 
the government light enough, to require actual notice.55 In support of 
its holding, the court noted that when the government is seeking a 
detainee’s cooperation and testimony against another, more 
dangerous criminal, it seems to have no problem ensuring that the 
detainee actually receives the message.56 
The Eighth Circuit’s approach was similar to the Second Circuit’s 
in that it required that actual notice be given to incarcerated 
individuals. However, the Eighth Circuit went even further. In United 
States v. Woodall,57 notice of forfeiture was sent to the property 
owner’s last known address and to the county jail,58 but the property 
owner claimed he did not receive actual notice at the address to 
 
 54. Weng, 137 F.3d at 709, 714-15. 
 55. Id. The interests of the property owner are potentially immense, as they can be forced 
to forfeit huge amounts of currency and property. No one but the detainee is likely to protect his 
interest, unlike other situations in which a large class of people may have common interests or 
may raise the same objections. Also, the detainee is unable to take any action in order to secure 
his receipt of his mail, rather he is entirely dependent upon the institution. Id. See also infra text 
accompanying note 56 (for explanation of why burden upon the government is not 
unreasonably heavy).  
 56. 137 F.3d at 709, 714-15. The fact that the government does ensure actual notice in 
certain situations shows that the burden is not heavy on the government to achieve actual 
notice. This is true because the jailor (the Bureau of Prisons) is part of the same government as 
the agency seeking to give notice, so the agency should easily be able to secure the jailor’s 
cooperation in actually delivering notice to the owner and providing a reliable record of the 
delivery. Id. The decision noted the disparity in treatment the government employs: in the 
situation where the inmate’s receipt is beneficial to the government, the government is careful 
to ensure actual receipt, whereas when it initiates proceedings to forfeit large sums of an 
inmate’s currency or property, “it is content to use the mails, with no assurance that the notice 
will reach the addressee.” Id.  
 57. 12 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1993). In Woodall, a man was arrested on a firearms charge for 
which he was later convicted, and the police seized currency from him while booking him at the 
jail. Id. at 792.  
 58. Id. at 794. While the individual did not dispute the delivery of the notice to either 
place the government claims to have sent it, he did claim that the notice letters were mailed 
while his criminal trial was pending, and that the court had granted his release on bond to an 
alternative address of which the government was aware.  
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which he was released on bond.59 The court held that if the facts were 
as the property owner alleged, the notice that the government 
provided was not adequate.60 Although the court in Woodall used the 
reasoning set forth in Mennonite,61 it also extended this decision by 
requiring actual notice any time the government is even prosecuting 
an individual and then initiates the forfeiture proceedings, regardless 
of whether or not the individual is detained.62 
2. Constructive Notice 
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits stood in opposition to the Second 
and Eighth Circuits with respect to notice of forfeiture cases. In 
United States v. Clark,63 the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of 
whether or not sending notice by certified mail to the property 
owner’s resident address and to the jail in which he is detained fulfills 
the requirements of the Due Process Clause.64 The court focused on 
the notice sent to the institution of incarceration65 and relied heavily 
 
 59. Id. Notice was mailed neither to this new address, nor to his attorney. He received no 
actual notice of the pendency of the forfeiture. Id.  
 60. Id. at 795. 
 61. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983). The Court in 
Woodall simply followed the reasoning in Mennonite by holding that actual notice is required in 
any case that threatens the liberty or property interests of an individual if the name and address 
are known or can be reasonably determined. 12 F.3d 791, 794 (1993). See also supra text 
accompanying note 35. 
 62. Woodall, 12 F.3d at 791, 794-95. The court went so far as to say that any time the 
government is detaining or prosecuting an individual “when it elects to impose the additional 
burden of defending a forfeiture proceeding, fundamental fairness surely requires that either the 
defendant or his counsel receive actual notice of the agency’s intent to forfeit in time to decide 
whether to compel the agency to proceed by judicial condemnation.” Id. (internal citations 
omitted). It should be noted that the court did not necessarily require actual notice to the 
individual by the government, as providing actual notice to the individual’s attorney would 
suffice. Id.  
 63. 84 F.3d 378 (10th Cir. 1996). Clark was a case involving an individual arrested on 
drug charges after negotiating the sale of drugs with an FBI agent. Following his arrest, the FBI 
seized currency from Clark and his partner. In connection with the arrest and seizure, the FBI 
initiated forfeiture proceedings. The issue in this case was whether the notice the FBI gave to 
Clark was constitutionally adequate. Id. at 379-80.  
 64. The notice sent to Clark’s resident address was signed by a woman who apparently 
was his mother-in-law. Id. at 380. There was also no dispute that Clark was in fact detained in 
the facility to which the second notice was sent at the time when it was received and signed for 
by someone at the facility. However, Clark maintained that he never received actual notice, and 
therefore, the attempts violated the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Id.  
 65. Id. at 381. 
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upon Mennonite66 in finding that the notice was constitutionally 
adequate.67 The court stated that it found no precedent to view mail as 
an inadequate means of providing notice or to require personal 
service of notice in jail, whether the property owner actually received 
the notice or not.68 
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v. 
Real Property,69 which concerned parallel forfeiture actions.70 The 
notice of the civil forfeiture was served by certified mail to both the 
county jail in which the property owner was detained and to his 
attorney.71 The court found that the government’s procedures 
satisfied the requirements in Mullane72 and rejected the individual’s 
claim that receiving actual notice was necessary.73 The decision 
 
 66. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983). 
 67. Clark, 84 F.3d at 378, 381. The court cited Mennonite to support its finding that 
“notice by mail is a constitutionally [adequate way] to provide actual notice.” Id. Thus, they 
found that the mailing of notice to the jail in which Clark was detained was enough. The fact 
that he may not have actually received it was considered irrelevant, as the FBI utilized means 
reasonably calculated to inform Clark of the pendency of the action. Id.  
 68. Id. The court held that “absent extraordinary circumstances,” the government is not 
required to attempt to provide “notice through every means calculated to provide actual notice,” 
and that these “extraordinary circumstances” were not met by Clark’s assertions that 
“‘[e]veryone is served in person in jail,’” and that the FBI “had reason” to know that most of 
the time [a certified letter is] never received by the person [who] is incarcerated.” Id.  
 69. 135 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1998). The facts of Real Property are as follows: the 
individual owned and operated a motel, which “was both his primary asset and his family’s 
home.” Id. at 1313. He was arrested and charged with several offenses arising out of selling 
drugs from the motel. One of these charges was criminal forfeiture. While the individual was 
detained pending trial, the government initiated civil forfeiture proceedings against him. The 
individual later plead guilty to all the criminal charges, and in exchange the government 
dropped the criminal forfeiture charge. However, the government retained the right to seek civil 
forfeiture, and proceeded to do so. The issue was whether or not the notice the government gave 
the individual as to the civil forfeiture proceedings was in compliance with the Due Process 
Clause. Id. at 1313-14. 
 70. Id. One of these actions was dropped in exchange for guilty pleas. 
 71. Id. The property owner conceded that he was detained in the facility that received the 
notice at the time that it was received, but denied that he received the notice. Id.  
 72. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). Specifically, 
the court found that the government had acted to “employ such notice ‘as one desirous of 
actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.’” Id. (quoted in 135 
F.3d at 1312, 1315). 
 73. 135 F.3d at 1316. The court also cited Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 
791, 800 (1983) in deciding that notice by mail or some other means as sure to provide actual 
notice is required if the property owner’s address can be reasonably ascertained, but that actual 
notice is not required by due process, even in the cases where the owner is incarcerated. 135 
F.3d at 1316.   
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afforded weight to the facility’s normal procedures in terms of 
delivering certified mail to detainees,74 and these procedures 
supported the court’s holding that the notice the government provided 
satisfied the Due Process Clause.75 
3. Intermediate Approach 
In United States v. One Toshiba Color Television,76 the Third 
Circuit adopted an intermediate approach. In this case, the 
government sent notice of civil forfeiture by certified mail to the 
institution in which the property owner was detained at the time.77 
However, the individual claimed that he never received notice and 
that he was not aware of the proceedings.78 The court acknowledged 
that this was an issue of first impression79 and proceeded to analyze 
whether or not the government must “go further” and ensure actual 
notice to incarcerated individuals against whom it forfeiture.80       
 
 74. 135 F.3d at 1315. According to a watch commander testifying as to the procedures of 
getting certified mail to the detainees, the jail personnel sign for the certified mail, they open it 
in the presence of the inmate in order to inspect it, and they then give it directly to the inmate. 
The court pointed to the fact that the property owner could provide no evidence that this is not 
the procedure that took place with the certified mail containing the notice of civil forfeiture, 
other than “his own bald declaration” to the contrary. Id.  
 75. Id. at 1316. 
 76. 213 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2000). In Toshiba, police officers and Drug Enforcement 
Administration agents arrested an individual named McGlory for conspiracy to possess heroin 
with intent to distribute. He was eventually convicted of several drug trafficking, drug 
laundering, and firearm possession charges and received a life sentence. On the day that 
McGlory was arrested, the officers seized several items of property from residences used by 
McGlory. The government later initiated forfeiture proceedings involving this seized property. 
The issue was whether the attempts to provide notice that the government made were in 
compliance with the Due Process Clause. Id. at 150-52.  
 77. Id. at 151. Until his sentencing, McGlory was detained in several different facilities 
with which the U.S. Marshals Service contracted. The government sent the notice to the 
detention center in which McGlory was housed at the time, and it was signed for by a jail 
officer. The government also for precaution sent notice to a pre-incarceration address, which 
was returned, and finally to McGlory’s ex-wife and an attorney. The latter mailings were in 
addition to the publication in a general circulation newspaper. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 152. Although the circuit partially delved into the issue previously, they did not 
fully explore it. See United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding 
that when a government agency is instigating forfeiture, it must send notice to the facility where 
the detainee is actually housed).  
 80. 213 F.3d at 152.  
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The court relied on Mullane81 and Robinson82 in holding that 
direct mail does not necessarily satisfy the due process 
requirements,83 and that the government must do more to ensure 
actual notice to the incarcerated individuals against whom it seeks 
forfeiture.84 Furthermore, the court analyzed both sides of the circuit 
split85 and adopted the Weng standard86 as a goal.87 This approach 
maintained the rationale of Weng88 but focused on the procedures in 
 
 81. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The court used 
Mullane to focus on the contextual nature of the standards for evaluating the adequacy of 
notice. 213 F.3d at 147, 152. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.  
 82. Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972). Robinson asserted that in the case of an 
incarcerated property owner, the notice of forfeiture must be sent to the place where he is 
actually detained. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.  
 83. Toshiba, 213 F.3d at 152-53. The government invoked the opinion from Mennonite 
Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983), to support the assertion that mailing notice 
directly to the actual location of the property owner “suffices to establish its successful 
discharge of its obligations . . . under the Due Process Clause.” 213 F.3d at 152-53. However, 
the court in Toshiba rejected this argument, using precedent to establish that “adequacy of 
notice is always evaluated by reference to the surrounding circumstances.” Id.; see also 
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; supra text accompanying notes 21-25.  
 84. Toshiba, 213 F.3d at 153. The court rejected the government’s argument even though 
it “carries strong surface appeal.” Id.; see also Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) 
(holding that even though notice was sent directly to an individual, the notice was inadequate 
because the individual was an incompetent tax payer). In reality, examples such as the Covey 
case illustrate the “imprudence of gleaning from Supreme Court precedent a per se rule that 
mail will always be adequate notice,” as it will change according to the circumstances. 213 F.3d 
at 153. 
 85. 213 F.3d at 153-54. In Toshiba, the court compared the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit 
in Unites States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378 (10th Cir. 1996), with the government’s arguments in the 
case at hand. Id. It then looked at the reasoning that the Second and Eighth Circuits employed 
(see supra text accompanying notes 46-62), which balanced the interests of the incarcerated 
individual and the state, tipped the scale toward the individual and thus required actual notice. 
213 F.3d at 153.  
 86. See supra text accompanying notes 50-58. 
 87. 213 F.3d at 154-55. The court in Toshiba said that the “relative burdens and benefits” 
of taking steps to provide actual notice show that requiring more effort from the government is 
correct. “In other words, there is much to commend the Weng approach, and as an aspiration, 
the Weng rule comports with our ideas of the sort of effort that the government should 
undertake when it wishes to effect notice of a forfeiture proceeding against a prisoner in federal 
custody.” Id.  
 88. Id at 153. The reasoning in Toshiba cited and echoed the rationales from the Second 
and Eighth Circuits, which used the balancing of interests and pointed out that when 
incarcerated, a prisoner lacks the power to ensure the actual delivery of his mail, especially if he 
is transferred often and he does not have much recourse for the inadequacy of deliveries (unlike 
those in the outside world). Id. It also pointed out that “[w]hen an individual is incarcerated at a 
location of the government’s choosing, the government’s ability to find and directly serve him 
or her with papers is at or near its zenith,” especially when the government’s attorneys have 
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place to effect actual notice rather than on whether the individual 
actually received the notice.89  
The Toshiba court disagree somewhat with mandating the actual 
notice standard. The court asserted that the Weng rule would place an 
undue evidentiary burden upon the government with the passage of 
time. The court reasoned that due to the possibility of a large gap of 
time separating the forfeiture notice and forfeiture proceedings from 
the due process challenge to such notice and proceedings, it was very 
likely that situations would arise where the notice was actually 
served, but the proper service could not be proved because 
documentation of the delivery of such notice was no longer 
available.90 The Third Circuit also expressed concern as to lower 
courts overstepping their boundaries and undermining the framework 
of the courts.91 Thus, the Third Circuit’s holding placed greater 
responsibility on the government to provide actual notice of forfeiture 
to incarcerated individuals but stopped short of the Second and 
Eighth Circuit standards.92 
 
extensive contact with the prisoner due to other criminal proceedings against him. Id. at 154.  
 89. Id at 155. The court thought this more appropriate because the Supreme Court never 
employed an actual notice standard, but had alternatively focused on the procedures that are 
reasonably likely to effect actual notice. Thus, the court would not adopt a strict actual notice 
standard, but “the concerns animating Weng will inform our decision as to the procedures 
designed to give notice.” Id.  
 90. Id. “An overly strict notice requirement, therefore, could lead to unsettling the 
outcome of completed proceedings based on nothing but bare allegations of a party who had 
lost his property.” Id.; see also United States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(dealing with a case in which the only evidence that the incarcerated individual did not receive 
actual notice was his own claim to the contrary). Id. However, the court in Toshiba did not give 
any examples of these situations in which it would be hard to prove delivery after the passage of 
time. 
 91. 213 F.3d at 155. The court thought the Weng approach “undermines the procedural 
analysis that has heretofore animated the Supreme Court’s dictates on this subject.” Id. 
Additionally, the court noted that an argument could be made that when a prisoner is held in a 
state facility, the federal government has less control over the prisoner. Id.; see also Donovan v. 
United States, 172 F.3d 53 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Weng rule is less reasonable as the 
federal government possesses less control over the incarcerated individual). However, the court 
also noted that the response to this argument would be that even if the prisoners are held in state 
facilities on federal charges, the federal government contracted with those state facilities, and 
would therefore be able to request/demand procedures that would ensure the delivery of notice 
to the detainees. 213 F.3d at 155.  
 92. Id. Therefore, the Third Circuit held that the government does not necessarily have to 
prove actual notice of forfeiture to the incarcerated individual. However, if the government 
decides against showing actual notice, “it bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of 
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT: DUSENBERY V. UNITED STATES  
A. Majority Opinion 
Recently, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in 
Dusenbery v. United States.93 In this case, the government sent 
forfeiture notice to the individual “in care of” his incarceration 
institution, to the address where the individual was arrested, “and to 
an address in the town where his mother lived.”94 An Inmate Systems 
Officer testified that he signed the certified mail receipt for the 
notice, and testified as to the procedures within the institution for 
getting certified mail to the inmates. The officer said that in 
accordance with procedure, he would log the mail and the inmates 
“Unit Team” would sign for it and then give it to the inmate.95 The 
officer did not know whether Dusenbery actually received the notice. 
Moreover, he testified that he was not familiar with the particular 
practices regarding the mail once it left the mailroom.96 He also 
testified that due to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) policy of holding 
prison logbooks for only one year after they were closed, there was 
no longer a paper trail.97  
The Court held that the government’s attempts at notice satisfied 
due process, regardless of whether the mail actually reached the 
individual. The majority stressed the fact that no Supreme Court case 
had required actual notice,98 and focused on the language in Mullane, 
which required only efforts “reasonably calculated” to inform the 
individual of the action.99 The Court also pointed to problems with 
 
procedures that are reasonably calculated to ensure that such notice will be given.” Id.  
 93. 122 S. Ct. 694 (2002). 
 94. Id. at 696.  
 95. Id. at 698. 
 96. Id. at 703 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). According to the officer, the mail after it left the 
mailroom would be the caseworker’s responsibility. However, no caseworker testified. Id.  
 97. Id. at 701. In this case, the claim of improper notice was asserted almost five years 
after the alleged notice (thus well after the one year period). Id. Incidentally, the Court learned 
from the Solicitor General that the BOP now requires the preservation of logbooks for eleven 
years. Id. at 698 n.2.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315). The Court in Dusenbery pointed out that no 
heroic efforts were necessary, comparing the assurance of actual notice in these cases to the 
heroics in the movie “Saving Private Ryan.” Id. at 701.  
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requiring actual notice involving the passage of time and the erosion 
of memory.100  
Although the Court acknowledged that the BOP has since 
implemented a new procedure that compels the inmate to sign a 
logbook acknowledging receipt, it questioned whether requiring the 
end recipient to sign for the mail does anything to ensure reliable 
measures leading up to the individual’s receipt.101 The Court was also 
quick to point out that even if the BOP’s new procedures do improve 
delivery, it does not mean that the old procedures were inadequate.102  
B. Dissenting Opinion 
In Dusenbery, Justice Ginsburg filed a dissent with which three 
other justices joined.103 Although Justice Ginsburg conceded that 
prior Supreme Court cases had recognized mail service as an 
adequate means of notice to supplement publication or posting,104 she 
also noted that the decisions analyzed the particular proceedings and 
facts of each situation as opposed to declaring mail adequate in all 
circumstances.105 Ginsburg emphasized the ease with which the 
government could insure the delivery of notice to an inmate, 
especially since the agency charged with providing the notice is a 
component of the same government as the prisoner’s custodian.106 
 
 100. Id. at 701. “What might be reasonably fresh in the minds of all parties had the 
question arisen contemporaneously will surely be stale five years later.” Id. The Court asserted 
that “the issue would often [depend] on disputed testimony as to whether” the individual 
actually received the letter. Id. However, the Court did not address the issue of how easily the 
records and logbooks could be maintained for an extended period of time. See supra text 
accompanying note 97.  
 101. 122 S. Ct. at 702. 
 102. Id. The Court believed that it was important to avoid punishing the government for 
past policies “simply because” of subsequent upgrades in such policies. This may discourage 
further upgrades. Id. 
 103. Id. at 702. 
 104. Id. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. The prior decisions “do not bless mail notice as an adequate-in-all-circumstances 
substitute for personal service.” Id.  
 106. Id. Ginsburg pointed to the portion of Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709, 715 (2d 
Cir. 1998) that speaks of how easily the government delivers messages in a manner which 
insure receipt when the government stands to benefit from such receipt. 122 S. Ct. at 705 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 56.  
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She additionally pointed out that an inmate receives his mail through 
the combined efforts of the postal service and the prison, neither of 
which he can monitor or influence.107 The fact that the postal system 
may be relied upon does not suggest that the prison system may also 
be relied upon to deliver notice to inmates.108 
Ginsburg said that there was no doubt that the government could 
“try harder” to ensure receipt of notice, “without undue 
inconvenience or expense.”109 This is demonstrated by the fact that 
the BOP has changed its policy so that inmates must now “sign a log 
book acknowledging delivery.”110 While Ginsburg agreed with the 
majority that the government should not be punished for improving 
its policies, she believed that the new rules show that significant 
procedural enhancements could have been made previously at 
“minimal expense and inconvenience.”111 She asserted that requiring 
the end recipient to sign for the mail does in fact ensure reliable 
measures leading up to the individual’s receipt in the same way that 
certified mail, return receipt requested, works for other postal 
customers.112 For these reasons, Justice Ginsburg felt that due process 
required that BOP employees “linger for the additional moments 
required to secure for each delivery a signature in a logbook.”113 
 
 107. 122 S. Ct. at 706 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 108. Id. Ginsburg implied that the prison system “may have every incentive to delay.” Id. 
She also noted that in the cases where the Supreme Court felt that notice by mail was adequate, 
“receipt hinged only upon the dependability of the postal service.” Id.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 101. 
 111. 122 S. Ct. at 706 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Therefore, the previous procedures did not 
satisfy due process under Mullane, 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See also supra text accompanying note 
102.  
 112. 122 S. Ct. at 706 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The sender has the opportunity to try 
again if they know the first attempt to deliver to the addressee failed. “Moreover, if forfeiture 
cannot be had absent a logbook signature or documentation that the addressee refused to sign, 
the BOP will have every incentive to make sure its internal procedures guarantee reliable 
delivery.” Id. at 707 n.3. This incentive diminishes “if all that is required is a general statement 
by a mailroom employee that it is prison policy to deliver inmate mail.” Id. at 707 n.3. 
 113. Id. at 707. This is nothing more than the “practicable, efficient, and inexpensive 
reform the BOP has already adopted.” Id.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Past Supreme Court Decisions 
Before Dusenbery,114 the Supreme Court had not dealt directly 
with the issue of the level of notice that the government is required to 
afford to incarcerated individuals against whom it is seeking 
forfeiture. However, the Court had provided language and rationale 
concerning notice that relates to the issue. In Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,115 the Court emphasized the fundamental 
nature of notice requirements and the opportunity of individuals to be 
apprised of their situations and to respond in the manner they so 
choose.116 Due to the fundamental nature of this individual right, the 
Court mandated that the party giving notice implement means of 
notice as if they truly wanted to inform the property owner.117 In 
these mandates, the Supreme Court made a move in favor of 
individual rights and the importance of true notice.118 The Court in 
Mullane also pointed out that the specific surrounding circumstances 
are determining factors in terms of the adequacy of notice,119 and it 
held that a means of notice is unconstitutional if it is not reasonably 
designed to reach an individual who could easily be notified by 
another available means.120 When applying the language of Mullane 
to an incarcerated individual, specific circumstances mandate that the 
government provide more than mere mailing of notice to the 
individual’s place of incarceration. Such mailing is not reasonably 
 
 114. 122 S. Ct. 694 (2002). 
 115. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 116. Id. at 314; see also supra text accompanying note 21. 
 117. Id. at 315.  
 118. Id. at 319-20. The Court shifted from the previously accepted position that publication 
was necessarily an adequate means of notice. In doing so, the Court looked at whether or not a 
reasonable business person who wished, for the purposes of his own self-interest, to 
communicate information to a person whose address he had on file would rely on publication. 
Since it is fairly obvious that he would not, the Court held that publication was not adequate in 
these situations. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 22. 
 119. 339 U.S. at 314. The specific circumstances Mullane speaks of include the degree of 
the property owner’s interest, the probability that someone else similarly situated will act in the 
individual’s interest, and the reasonableness of requiring more from the party attempting to give 
notice. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 21.  
 120. Id. at 319; see also supra text accompanying note 24. 
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calculated to reach the individual when the government could easily 
have the individual sign for the mail and thus ensure actual notice. 
In Robinson v. Hanrahan,121 the Supreme Court crept closer to an 
actual notice requirement122 in holding that the government’s mailing 
of notice to an incarcerated individual’s home address was not 
constitutional since the government knew that the defendant lacked 
access to that address.123 The means implemented here were not 
reasonably designed to actually inform the individual, especially 
since the individual could easily be informed by the available 
alternative of delivery to his place of incarceration.124  
The Court stayed on the same path in Mennonite Board of 
Missions v. Adams,125 where it advocated the desirability of actual 
notice.126 The Court spoke of mail or any means as sure to guarantee 
actual notice as “a minimum constitutional precondition to a 
proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property 
interests of any party.”127 Although the Court spoke of mail as a 
constitutional means to send notice and did not adopt an actual notice 
requirement,128 it was looking at a case in which the individual was 
free129 and therefore had control of his mail. This is an entirely 
different situation from an incarcerated individual who does not have 
such control and who has no real recourse for mail that he does not 
actually receive. 
In Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope130 the 
Court again advocated actual notice.131 Here, the Court again looked 
 
 121. 409 U.S. 38 (1972). 
 122. Id. It should be noted, however, that Robinson did not go so far as to advocate actual 
notice, it merely took another step in that direction. 
 123. Id. at 40. The Court stated that this form of notice could not possibly be seen as 
designed to inform the individual of the pendency of the forfeiture. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. 462 U.S. 791 (1983). 
 126. Id. at 800. 
 127. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 35. 
 128. Id. at 798. The Court refused to impose the burden of going to extraordinary lengths to 
identify and find the location of a mortgagee. See also supra text accompanying note 34.  
 129. The issue in Mennonite was the means and level of notice constitutionally required to 
be afforded to a mortgagee when property was going to be sold because of nonpayment of 
taxes. Id. at 792-93; see also supra text accompanying note 32. 
 130. 485 U.S. 478 (1988). 
 131. Id. The Court cites Mullane, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), and Mennonite, 462 U.S. 791 
(1983), in holding that due process requires notice sent by mail or any other means as sure to 
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at the special circumstances, and it emphasized balancing the interest 
of the individual with that of the government.132 In its analysis, the 
Court concluded that providing actual notice to those whose 
addresses the government knows or could reasonably ascertain does 
not excessively burden its interest in expeditiously resolving the 
proceedings.133 While the Court in Tulsa did view mail as a means 
reasonably designed to ensure actual notice,134 it was again dealing 
with a free individual.135 The analysis of whether or not mail is 
reasonably calculated to provide actual notice to an individual 
changes drastically when it shifts from a free individual to one who is 
incarcerated and who is at the mercy of the institution when it comes 
to receiving such mail. Thus, applying the reasoning and the 
balancing test forwarded in Tulsa, the government should do more 
than simply mail notice to an incarcerated individual at his institution 
of incarceration in order to reasonably ensure actual notice.  
B. Courts Mandating Actual Notice Before Dusenbery 
Prior to Dusenbery,136 the court in Weng held that when an 
individual is incarcerated by the government, the government must 
deliver the notice not only to the correct institution of incarceration, 
but actually to the individual.137 This is necessary in order to fulfill 
the requirement established in Mullane that the notice be reasonably 
 
provide actual notice. 485 U.S. at 478, 489-91.  
 132. 485 U.S. at 489-90. In Tulsa, the balance was between the individual’s serious and 
practical need for actual notice and the government’s interest in expeditiously resolving 
probates. Id. at 489.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. The Court spoke of notice by mail as an economical and efficient means that is 
reasonably designed to provide actual notice. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 44 and 
accompanying text. 
 135. Pope dealt with the constitutionality of a state probate law requiring claims against an 
estate be presented within a certain time period after notice of the instigation of probate 
proceedings was given by means of publication. Id. at 479; see also supra text accompanying 
note 38. 
 136. 122 S. Ct. 694 (2002). 
 137. Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1998). The court held that the 
notice must be actually delivered to the individual (as opposed to merely the individual’s 
correct institution), “absent special justifying circumstances.” Id. However, it did not expand 
upon what special circumstances would justify such action. Id.  
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calculated to reach and inform the detainee.138 This position is 
reasonable, because it takes into consideration the balancing test from 
Mullane.139 Using this formula, the court showed that in cases where 
the government incarcerates an individual on the same grounds for 
which it is seeking forfeiture, the interest the individual has in actual 
notice outweighs the burden placed on the government to provide 
such actual notice.140  
This is the logical outcome from the balancing test because the 
individual’s interest is potentially very high and the burden on the 
government is quite low. The individual’s interest is so high because 
he may be forfeiting extremely large amounts of currency and 
property, there is no one similarly situated who is likely to protect the 
individual’s interest,141 and the individual is entirely dependent upon 
the institution to secure the delivery of his mail.142  
On the other hand, the burden placed on the government to ensure 
actual notice of forfeiture to its detainees is relatively light. The 
Bureau of Prisons acts as the jailor, and it is part of the same 
government as that which is trying to institute forfeiture claims and 
provide notice. Therefore, the government should easily be able to 
secure the cooperation of the agency in accurately delivering the 
notice to the detainee and in providing reliable documentation of such 
detainee’s actual receipt.143 This simple extra step does not seem like 
 
 138. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also 
supra text accompanying note 21.  
 139. 339 U.S. at 314-19. This balancing test, established in Mullane, identified the specific 
factors in each situation to be examined as the level of interest of the individual, the probability 
that someone else similarly situated will represent the individual’s interests, and the 
reasonableness of imposing more requirements on the party attempting to give notice. Id.; see 
also supra text accompanying note 21. 
 140. Weng, 137 F.3d at 709, 714-15.  
 141. This lack of anyone similarly situated to fight for the interests of the individual is true 
in the cases of incarcerated individuals being prosecuted on the same grounds upon which the 
forfeiture is based, whereas it is not true in situations where a large class of people may share 
common interests and the individual’s interest will naturally be represented by others in the 
group. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 142. This lack of control is limited to incarcerated individuals, because those who are free 
have ways to ensure actual delivery of mail to their correct location and have means of recourse 
if the mail is not delivered properly. This is not true for detainees who are at the mercy of their 
institution and have no real recourse against the institution if they do not actually receive mail 
that is delivered for them. 
 143. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol10/iss1/9
p295 Murphy-Riveria book pages.doc  12/19/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Notice of Forfeiture to Incarcerated Individuals 315 
 
an undue burden to place on the government. This is especially true 
since the government does employ means necessary to ensure actual 
notice to incarcerated individuals when it is in the government’s own 
best interest. For example, when the government is attempting to 
secure a prisoner’s cooperation against some other prisoner or 
criminal, there is never a problem with providing actual notice.144 
Therefore, since the government easily ensures actual notice when it 
truly is desirous of informing an incarcerated individual, it naturally 
flows that in order to fulfill the requirements set forth in Mullane,145 
the government must ensure actual notice to incarcerated individuals 
in forfeiture proceedings as well. 
C. Dusenbery and its Predecessors in Constructive Notice 
In Dusenbery,146 the Supreme Court recently held that notice 
mailed to the institution in which the individual was detained was 
enough to satisfy due process.147 This decision affirmed a number of 
holdings that had allowed constructive notice in the circuit courts.148 
These courts relied heavily upon the language in Mennonite149 that 
supports mail as a constitutionally adequate means of notice in 
forfeiture proceedings.150 However, the Supreme Court put forward a 
special circumstances approach in Mullane,151 mandating means 
calculated “under all the circumstances” to inform the individual of 
the proceedings.152 Yet, the Court in Dusenbery and the circuit courts 
all failed to consider any of the special circumstances involved in 
 
 144. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
 145. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Specifically, the 
government must act as one who is truly desirous of informing the individual. Id. at 315. Since 
we know what means the government employs when it is desirous of informing a detainee, it is 
only right to require that the government utilize these same means in cases of notice of 
forfeiture. 
 146. 122 S. Ct. 694 (2002). 
 147. Id.  
 148. See United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Real 
Property, 135 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 
F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 149. 462 U.S. 791 (1983). 
 150. 84 F.3d at 381; see also supra text accompanying note 35. 
 151. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).  
 152. Id.  
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these particular cases involving incarcerated individuals. The courts 
did not discuss the balance of the interest between the incarcerated 
individual at the mercy of his institution and the burden on the 
government of providing actual notice to an individual under its 
control.153  
The Dusenbery Court also avoided the requirement from Mullane 
that the party providing notice must act as one actually desirous of 
informing the individual.154 Specifically, the Court avoided taking 
into account the situations in which the government truly does want 
to inform an incarcerated individual and the means they adopt in 
those situations in order to ensure actual notice.155 The Ninth 
Circuit156 attempted to address this Mullane requirement when it 
found that the government, in its attempt at notice, acted as one who 
truly desired to inform the individual.157 However, even in this 
analysis, it failed to recognize the how differently and more diligently 
the government attempts to ensure notice when it is in the 
government’s interest to do so.158 
The Supreme Court in Dusenbery, along with the Ninth159 and the 
Third Circuits,160 focused on the procedures the facilities 
implemented in order to achieve actual notice rather than on whether 
or not actual notice was truly achieved.161 However, this approach 
fails to recognize the special circumstances involved, especially the 
ease with which the government can secure the location of and obtain 
a signature from every single incarcerated individual under its 
 
 153. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 21, 55-56; see also Dusenbery, 122 S. Ct. 
at 702-03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 154. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).  
 155. The Court in Mullane looked to the standards of the business world and the 
procedures utilized when they truly wanted to apprise an individual of something. Id. at 319-20. 
Logically, it follows that in the context of incarcerated individuals, the court should look to the 
procedures the government puts into place when it is attempting to inform an incarcerated 
individual of something that serves a government interest. Id.; see also Dusenbery v. United 
States, 122. S. Ct. 694, 705 (2002).  
 156. United States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 157. Id. at 1312, 1315;  see also supra text accompanying note 72. 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 56, 144-45 (analyzing the procedures the 
government employs when it is in the government’s best interest to ensure actual notice to 
incarcerated individuals).  
 159. Real Property, 135 F.3d at 1312. 
 160. United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75, 89-92, 95-97. 
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control.162 Therefore, due process should dictate that institutions 
implement procedures which ensure and document actual notice in 
every case.163 
In Dusenbery and Toshiba, the Supreme Court and Third Circuit 
expressed their concern that an actual notice requirement would place 
an undue evidentiary burden on the government, especially with the 
passage of time.164 However, this view does not take modern 
technology into account. Today, individuals’ receipt of and signature 
for packages and certified mail are entered into computers daily 
where they can be instantly tracked. This information can be stored 
indefinitely in computers, or a copy of such receipt could be placed in 
an individual’s file. With this in mind, the evidentiary burden upon 
the government does not seem to be unreasonable at all. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Recently, the Supreme Court held against requiring the 
government to provide actual notice to incarcerated individuals in 
order to satisfy due process.165 However, the arguments against an 
actual notice requirement forwarded by Dusenbery and the circuits 
that it validated are not as strong or persuasive as the arguments in 
favor of such a requirement. Utilizing the balancing test offered by 
the Supreme Court in Mullane,166 it is clear that the property owner’s 
interest is potentially extremely high, there is no one similarly 
situated to act in the interest of the individual, and he does not have 
the opportunity to exercise any control over whether or not he 
actually receives any correspondence.167 The test weighs this 
individual interest against the burden on the government in securing 
actual notice to incarcerated individuals. This burden is relatively 
 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 56, 88; see also Dusenbery v. United States, 122 
S. Ct. 694, 707 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (speaking of how easily an officer can “linger 
for the additional moments required” to obtain signatures from the incarcerated individuals).  
 163. It is important to note that actual notice to the incarcerated individual’s attorney 
constitutes actual notice to the individual.  
 164. 213 F.3d at 155; 122 S. Ct. 701.  
 165. Dusenbery, 122 S. Ct. at 694. 
 166. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-19 (1950); see also 
supra text accompanying note 21. 
 167. See supra text accompanying note 55; see also supra text accompanying note 16. 
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light when considering modern technology and the complete control 
the government has over the individual.168 The individual’s interest 
significantly outweighs the burden on the government, and therefore 
due process demands that the government provide actual notice of 
forfeiture to those it incarcerates.  
The decision in Dusenbery, in accepting constructive notice, 
tolerates a procedure that does not reliably ensure that an inmate will 
receive notice sent to him.169 This case “diminishes the safeguard of 
notice, affording an opportunity to be heard, before one is deprived of 
property,”170 and it is therefore contrary to due process.    
 
 168. See supra text accompanying note 56; see also supra text accompanying note 17. 
 169. Dusenbery, 112 S. Ct. at 702 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 170. Id.  
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